Counterarguments and counterexamples. by Corcoran, John
 1 
Corcoran, J. 2010. Counterarguments and counterexamples. 
 
 English translation of an entry on pages 137–42  of the Spanish-language dictionary of 
logic: Luis Vega, Ed. Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación, y Retórica. Madrid: Trotta. 
 
 
Counterarguments/Counterexamples 
John Corcoran 
 
A counterargument for a given argument is an argument having all true premises, a false 
conclusion, and the same form as the given argument.  
 
Consider the following one-premise argument whose premise and conclusion are about 
numbers in the sense of the non-negative integers, the so-called natural numbers 
beginning with zero. Zero is neither positive nor negative, of course, but all other 
numbers in this sense are positive  
 
Argument 1 
If zero is positive, then every number is positive. 
Every number that is not zero is positive. 
 
The premise and conclusion are both true: the premise is to be understood as a material 
conditional with a false antecedent and false consequent. Some people think that this 
argument is valid, i. e., that its conclusion follows logically from its premise, that the 
conclusion contains no new information, that the conclusion simply repeats some or all of 
the information in the premise. But they are mistaken. 
 
By putting “one” for “zero” and “even” for “positive”, we get another argument in the 
same form. 
 
Argument 2 
If one is even, then every number is even. 
Every number that is not one is even. 
 
The premise is true for the same reason the other one was. But the conclusion is false: 
three is a counterexample. There are infinitely many other counterexamples for the 
conclusion. Every odd number except one is a counterexample for the proposition “Every 
number that is not one is even”. Of course, only one counterexample is necessary for a 
universal proposition to be false. 
 
Since the premise of argument 2 is true but the conclusion false, argument 2 is invalid. 
The principle of fact is that every argument having all true premises and false conclusion 
is invalid. This is closely related to the fact that no false proposition follows logically 
from true propositions. Thus, argument 2 is invalid. 
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Moreover, argument 1 is in the same logical form as argument 2. The principle of form is 
that any two arguments in the same form are both valid or both invalid. It follows that 
that every argument in the same logical form as an invalid argument is invalid.  Thus, 
argument 1 is invalid. 
 
Argument 1, which seemed to some to be valid, is seen to be invalid by the production of 
a counterargument, i.e., by exhibition of another argument that is a counterargument for 
it. This method of proving an argument to be invalid is called the counterargument 
method or the method of counterargument.  
 
By reference to the above-stated facts and the above stipulative definition of the word 
‘counterargument’, we conclude that argument 2 is a counterargument for argument 1. 
Moreover, since every argument is in the same logical for as itself, argument 2 is a 
counterargument for itself. In fact, every argument having all true premises and false 
conclusion is a counterargument for itself and for every other argument in the same 
form—regardless of whether anyone ever noticed.  
 
Above ‘counterargument’ was contextually defined and used in the relational expression 
‘is a counterargument for’. But it is natural to use it in the predicational expression ‘is a 
counterargument’ as in the sentence ‘argument 2 is a counterargument’. Just as a brother 
is a person that is a brother of someone, a counterargument is an argument that is a 
counterargument for some argument. In fact, the three-word predicational expression ‘is 
a counterargument’ is often regarded as elliptical for the six-word predicational 
expression ‘is a counterargument for some argument’. 
  
It is worth emphasizing that there are many invalid arguments not yet know to be invalid 
and that there are many arguments not yet known to be counterarguments. The method of 
counterargument requires a known counterargument—if it is to be used to produce 
knowledge of invalidity. Exhibiting an argument not known to be a counterargument 
proves nothing even if the argument exhibited happens to be a counterargument. This is a 
form of begging the question or petitio principii. 
 
As another example, consider the following one-premise argument having a true premise 
and a true conclusion. This argument has appeared valid to many people. 
 
Argument 3 
If two is a prime number, then two is an even prime number. 
Two is even. 
 
However, by substituting “one” for “two”, a counterargument is produced. 
 
Argument 4 
If one is a prime number, then one is an even prime number. 
One is even. 
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When applying the method of counterargument, it is advisable to follow the maxim of 
minimal manipulation: change the argument as little as necessary. 
 
As a final example, consider the following two-premise argument having all true 
premises and a true conclusion. 
 
Argument 5. 
Every square is a polygon. 
Every rectangle is a polygon. 
Every square is a rectangle. 
 
This argument is not likely to seem valid to anyone. Yet, someone might not be quite sure 
that it is invalid. The method of counterargument can often be used to achieve certainty 
that an argument is invalid. By substituting “triangle” for “rectangle”, argument 5 is 
transformed into argument 6, which therefore has the same form. 
 
Argument 6 
Every square is a polygon. 
Every triangle is a polygon. 
Every square is a triangle. 
 
The two premises are evidently true, but every square is a counterexample for the 
conclusion, which is therefore false. Thus, argument 6 is a counterargument for argument 
5. Argument 5 is thus established to be invalid. 
 
One way of disproving a false singular statement that a certain argument is valid is to 
exhibit an argument known to be one of its counterarguments. 
 
One way of disproving a false universal proposition is to exhibit an object known to be 
one of its counterexamples. This method of disproving a universal proposition is called 
the counterexample method or the method of counterexample. Exhibiting an object not 
known to be a counterexample proves nothing—even if the object exhibited happens to 
be a counterexample. This is a form of begging the question or petitio principii. Despite 
the fact that every false universal proposition has a counterexample, sometimes it has no 
known counterexamples and thus the method of counterexample cannot be used—other 
methods must be tried. For example, it is easy to see that the false universal proposition 
“every cancer has been detected” has no known counterexamples.  
 
 
The expressions ‘is a counterargument for’ and ‘has the same logical form as’ are quite 
similar. Each expresses a relation between two arguments, i.e. a relation of an argument 
to an argument. It is important to resist the temptation to say ‘to another argument’ 
instead of ‘to an argument’ because both relations have some reflexivity: every argument 
is in the same logical form as itself and every argument with all true premises and a false 
conclusion is a counterargument for itself.  Moreover, both are transitive: every argument 
in the same logical form as an argument in the same logical form as a given argument is 
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in the same logical form as the given argument and every argument that is a 
counterargument for an argument that is a counterargument for a given argument is a 
counterargument for the given argument. However, although the relation expressed by ‘is 
in the same logical form as’, formal identity, let us say, is symmetrical in the sense that 
every given argument is in the same logical form as any argument in the same logical 
form as the given argument, nevertheless the relation expressed by ‘is a counterargument 
for’, counterargumentation, let us say, is not symmetrical: argument 2 is a 
counterargument for argument 1 but argument 1 is not a counterargument for argument 2. 
In fact, argument 1 is not a counterargument for any argument: argument 1 does not have 
a false conclusion. But, counterargumentation is symmetrical with respect to arguments 
having all true premises and false conclusion: any argument having all true premises and 
false conclusion that is a counterargument for a given argument having all true premises 
and false conclusion has the given argument as a counterargument. 
 
The expressions ‘is a counterexample for’ and ‘is a counterargument for’ are quite 
distinct. Whereas counterargumentation is a homogeneous relation in the sense that it 
relates members of a certain genus to members of the same genus—arguments to 
arguments; the relation expressed by ‘is a counterexample for’, counterexemplification, 
let us say, is a heterogeneous relation in the sense that it relates members of a certain 
genus to members of a usually different genus—numbers to propositions and squares to 
propositions in the two cases considered above. 
 
Counterexemplification relates an object to a universal proposition whose subject genus 
includes the object and whose predicate does not apply to the object. In “every swan is 
white”, swan is the genus serving as subject and being white is the predicate. Every swan 
that is non-white is a counterexample for the proposition that every swan is white.  
Conversely, every counterexample for the proposition that every swan is white is a swan 
that is not white.  In order for a universal proposition to be true it is necessary and 
sufficient for there to be no counterexamples for it.  In order for a given object of one 
given genus to be a counterexample for a given proposition it is necessary and sufficient 
for the proposition to be a universal affirmative proposition having the given genus as its 
subject and for its predicate to fail to apply to the given object.  
 
This stipulative definition of ‘counterexample’ is clear and natural. Moreover it covers all 
cases that are translated into natural language from symbolic logic where the only two 
quantifiers are the universal and existential affirmatives. However, it leaves out the 
universal negative. 
 
It would seem natural to say that zero is a counterexample for the universal negative 
proposition “No number is square” even though this does not fit the definition above. The 
choices are to take the sentence ‘no number is square’ to express the universal affirmative 
proposition “Every number is non-square”, or to define an object to be a virtual 
counterexample to a proposition logically equivalent to one it is a real counterexample to, 
or to change the definition. If the term is to be used basically in connection with symbolic 
logic, the best thing seems to be to keep to the above definition and to admit that, 
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although the relation of zero to “No number is square” is like counterexemplification, it is 
not strictly speaking that exact relation. 
 
Moreover, the above definition requires certain rephrasing. Four is a counterexample for 
“every even number is oblong”. The rephrasing is “every number is oblong if even”: four 
does not have the property “oblong if even” because it is even but not oblong. 
 
Although counterexemplification is a heterogeneous relation there are cases in which it 
relates members of a certain genus to members of the same genus—propositions to 
propositions. “Every proposition is true” is a proposition that is not true and thus is a 
counterexample for “Every proposition is true”. The property of being a proposition that 
is a counterexample for itself, which belongs to many propositions, is fascinating but so 
far not important.  “Every proposition is false” is a proposition that is false and thus is not 
a counterexample for “Every proposition is false”. However, it is a counterexample for 
“Every proposition is true”.   
 
In certain contexts it is convenient to use alternative terminology. We can define an 
object to counterexemplify the propositions for which it is a counterexample: zero 
counterexemplifies “Every number is positive”.  
 
The words ‘counterargument’ and ‘counterexample’ are made by attaching the prefix 
‘counter’ to the common nouns ‘argument’ and ‘example’ thus raising the question of 
whether the opposite prefix ‘pro’ can be similarly used. Although  proargument has not 
yet been coined, there is an established use for proexample. 
 
Every swan that is black is a proexample for the existential proposition that some swan is 
black; and every proexample for that proposition is a swan that is black.  In order for an 
existential proposition to be true it is necessary and sufficient for there to be at least one 
proexample for it.  Accordingly, an existential proposition can be proved to be true by 
one known proexample, but it can never be proved to be false by examples. “Some cancer 
has not been detected” is a true existential that cannot be proved by the method of 
proexample. Similarly, a universal proposition can be proved to be false by one known 
counterexample, but it can never be proved to be true by examples.   
